题    目：Does Advance Price Announcement Facilitate Tacit Collusion in Liner Shipping?（承运人发布的提价声明可否促成价格共谋？）

演 讲 人：陈刚教授，上海海事大学—中国（上海）自贸区供应链研究院

主 持 人：镇璐教授，十大正规网投官网平台(中国)有限公司

时    间：2019年5月9日（周四）上午10:00-11:00

地    点：校本部东区十大正规网投官网平台实477室

主办单位：十大正规网投官网平台(中国)有限公司、十大正规网投官网平台(中国)有限公司青年教师联谊会

演讲人简介：

    陈刚，上海海事大学—中国（上海）自贸区供应链研究院，教授。曾求学于大连海事大学和南丹麦大学，分别获得国际航运管理学士学位和物流管理博士学位。2012年起在（丹麦）奥尔堡大学任助理教授，2015年晋升为终身副教授。2018年底入职上海海事大学。研究方向包括集装箱作业系统研究、船队能效管理、航运数字化、航运定价与竞争等等。与北欧多家航运企业有紧密的研究合作，包括马士基航运、Torm、Lauritzen，Vessel Performance Solution等，承担或参与多个丹麦和欧盟的航运研究项目。其科研成果获得国际上的认可，包括在2009年国际海运学家年会上荣获最佳会议论文奖，在2010年世界物流与海运系统年会上获得最佳员工论文奖。目前担任Journal of Navigation的副主编，以及多个国际期刊的客座编辑，包括Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review，Annals of Operations Research，Simulation等等。

演讲内容简介：

    In ocean shipping, container carriers often use ‘general rate increase’ (GRI) announcements through public channels to signal to customers an intended price increase. Typically, the announcements are made almost simultaneously by several carriers, with a similar price increase amount and the same implementation date. This practice has caught the attention of market governance authorities such as the European Commission, who suspect it facilitates tacit price collusion among competing carriers. To provide a theoretical reference for relevant authorities, several key questions have to be addressed, such as: 1) How a carrier reacts to another’s GRI at the announcement stage; 2) when a set of GRIs are announced, how much collusion will be generated if market conditions remain the same over time; and 3) if the market conditions change over time, how can a carrier predict it and what will the impact be on the first two questions? To begin with, this paper addresses the middle question, by presenting a GRI game model based on a Bertrand competition model and a withdrawal option feature. The proposed model captures the relationships between GRI outcome and certain influencing factors, such as competition intensity, the number of participating carriers, and the time that elapses before silent withdrawal means discovered by competitors etc. This analysis demonstrates that in limited market conditions GRI could allow tacit collusion, pushing the price higher than the Bertrand equilibrium. Through validation in selected historical cases, this model shows significant explanatory power for potential collusion enabled by GRI. It sets a basic understanding of GRI-like advance price announcement; and when the other research questions are addressed, their integration will provide solid theoretical reference for constructive dialogue between authorities and carriers on market regulation in the future.

欢迎广大师生参加！