题    目：Internal Ratings and Loan Contracting: Evidence from a State-owned Bank around a Massive Economic Stimulus Programme（内部评级和贷款合同：来自一家国有银行大规模经济刺激计划的证据）

演 讲 人：原红旗，复旦大学十大正规网投官网平台教授

主 持 人：徐宗宇，上海大学十大正规网投官网平台教授

时    间：2019年10月16日（周三），下午1:30

地    点：校本部东区十大正规网投官网平台420室

主办单位：十大正规网投官网平台(中国)有限公司、十大正规网投官网平台(中国)有限公司青年教师联谊会

演讲人简介：

复旦大学十大正规网投官网平台会计学系教授，博士生导师。美国斯坦福大学、香港科技大学访问学者。研究方向为财务会计和公司财务。曾多次主持、参与国家自然科学、社会科学基金项目。论文发表在《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》、《Contemporary Accounting Research》、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《会计研究》等国内外优秀期刊。

演讲内容简介：

Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Importantly, the rating-interest relation goes back to normal after the stimulus programme ends, suggesting that any deviation is temporary. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

欢迎广大师生参加！